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R&D appropriability and market structure
in a preemption model.
Adriana Breccia
Abstract
Numerous studies have examined how market structure aects appropri-
ability of R&D returns and, in turn, R&D investment and innovation speed.
Less eort has been spent on the opposite relationship which is instead our fo-
cus. In a continuous time model, two rms compete in R&D, with the leading
patent aecting the probability of success of a second patent (competing in the
same product market); the size and the direction of this eect depends on the
level of appropriability, which, unlike previous research, connects competition
in R&D and competition in the product market. We nd that low appropri-
ability delays R&D investments and thus discovery, with the (future) benet
of a more competitive product market. Secondly, we show that the relation
between concentration in R&D and concentration in product markets can be
positive or negative depending on the probability of success of an innovation
and its level of appropriability. Also, we nd that an increase in the probability
of success of innovation does not necessarily speed up investment in R&D.
JEL Classication: C7, D8, O3, K4.
Keywords: real options, intellectual property, R&D, geometric Brownian motion,
Stackelberg games.
Introduction
The performance of knowledged-based industries is central to growth in modern
economies. Understanding the role of innovation in their investment decisions and
how these are aected by institutional and technological aspects protecting appropri-
ability of R&D is, hence, a key topic for economic policymakers. This is particularly
true for pharmaceutical, chemical and bio-tech industries where investment in R&D
is exceptionally high compared to other industries.
This paper analyses the interaction between competing patents targeting the same
Product Market (PM) within a real options framework. Firms compete in producing
innovations via R&D and then compete in the PM. The rm that makes the rst
discovery patents the result and thereby the lead patent has an eect on the proba-
bility of innovation of its rival. Understanding this eect, its direction and size, and
its implications on PM competition is the central element to our analysis as in turn
Email address: adrianabreccia@gmail.com.
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this drives investment in R&D. For instance, the rst patent might reduce (and not
necessarily to zero) the probability of a second innovation thereby reducing compe-
tition in the PM; or despite the design eorts of a lead innovator, the lead patent
might increase the probability of rivals' innovation thus intensifying competition in
the PM. In turn the eect of appropriability of R&D on PM competition drives R&D
investment.
Beside uncertainty in R&D with dependency between patents, which is the new
methodological feature of the current study, a second form of uncertainty in our
model, very common in the real-option preemption literature, is uncertainty in the
PM.1
Unlike previous research, by looking at the probabilistic nature of innovations
with its correlations to future discoveries, we can analyse a wide spectrum of cases
-from innovations with fully blocking patents to those with large spillovers. Earlier
related research on R&D races has focussed either on winner-takes-all patent races in
which the successful innovator acquires a permanent monopoly in the PM (see, for
example, Hsu and Lambrecht (2007), Weeds (2002), Lambrecht (1999)), or on PM
competition with no uncertainty in R&D, such as Grenadier2 (2002) or on independent
innovations based on dierent technologies which can be separately patentable as in
Miltersen and Schwartz (2004). Hence, apart from Miltersen and Schwartz, in these
past studies, patents are modelled in extreme ways either as providing the holder
with full IP protection (i.e., fully blocking competition for the duration of the patent)
or as providing no protection at all. Therefore, by considering a varying degree of
R&D appropriability one can examine the entire spectrum of cases between these two
extremes.
The decision variable of our work is the timing of R&D investment, which we
model as a Stackelberg-real-option game. However, this apparently simple decision
variable (`when' rather than `how much' to invest) can explain how apropriability
aects the market structure and the speed of innovation.
We nd that strong appropriability accelerates R&D investment, thus making
discovery more likely to occur at an early stage. This socially desirable outcome
must be weighted against the cost of a long lasting monopoly. On the contrary, low
appropriability weakens competition in R&D, delaying R&D investment and thus
discovery, with the (future) benet of a more competitive PM though. In general
terms, this result contradicts the belief that competition in R&D is positively related
to competition in the product market3.
1In our paper, as in a large number of studies which stem from the seminal work of Smets (1991),
PM demand is stochastic.
2This paper is a general strategic exercise game of the option to invest in additional capacity
and increase output, which, as suggested in the paper, can be applied to model R&D investment
decisions.
3Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) look at the eect of PM on R&D (thus, with reverse causality
compared to our study) and nd that \competition in R&D necessitates imperfect competition in
product markets", hence in line with our result.
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In other words, we identify a trade o between timing of innovation and degree
of competition in the product market, and where a particular product or industry
stands along this trade o depends on the level of appropriability of innovations. A
welfare analysis goes beyond the scope of our study, however recognising the trade
o between timing of innovation and market structure is a necessary step to analyse
the welfare implication of IP protection.
An example can help clarifying. Imagine that two identical rms can undertake
costly R&D to discover a drug whose nal demand depends on the impact of a
certain disease. If a wide patent can be obtained upon discovery, even if one of
the two rms has already invested in R&D, the prospect of monopolistic revenues
(due to the strength of the rst patent) can still attract the rival to undergo R&D
at an early stage, that is, even if the PM demand is not \booming". Therefore
competition in R&D starts early (relatively to the state of the demand) and, with
both rms undergoing R&D, discovery is more likely to occur. On the contrary, if
the leading patent is weak, then the demand for the drug should be suciently high
for lower, competitive prots to attract a competitor into R&D investment. Thus,
competition in R&D occurs at a later stage and discovery is delayed. In other words,
as appropriability narrows, competition in R&D is postponed and, with only a leading
rm undergoing R&D for a longer period of time (until the demand is suciently
high), the probability of discovery decreases.
Secondly, we nd that the relation between competition in R&D and competition
in the product market is aected by the interaction between the degree of appro-
priability and the technological challenges of R&D. Our study predicts that, when
appropriability is high (thus leading to more persistent monopoly in PM), there are
longer gaps between consecutive R&D investments in more challenging innovations
and shorter gaps between R&D investments in less challenging innovations; with low
appropriability the opposite situation results.
Our approach, based on a two-stage model of competition, seems particularly
relevant for high-technology and intensive-knowledge based industries such as phar-
maceutical, chemical, bio-tech. In these industries it is common to observe a few
patented products of similarly perceived quality competing in the market. Typically,
pharmaceutical R&D occurs along these lines, with a very small number of rms tar-
geting a particular therapeutic class and competing in R&D.4 Patents are normally
designed to reduce the number of possible variants (i.e. alternative technologies)
which enable production of substitute drugs by competitors. How wide the spectrum
of alternative technologies is and how well a patent can carve out part of this spec-
trum is the main task of a patent agent, whose aim is eventually to reduce (ideally
to zero) the probability of substitute discoveries by competitors.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We present the related litera-
ture in Section I. Then in Section II, we give an overview of the model and introduce
our assumptions. In Section III, we characterize a Stackelberg equilibrium and nd
4Schweitzer (2007).
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an equilibrium solution. Section IV describes the model implications and Section V
claries some aspects of pharmaceutical innovations and patents, which are in line
with the methodology used in our model. In the concluding section we suggest some
directions to extend the current work.
I Related literature
There is a vast literature in growth theory on the interaction between PM and R&D
competition (see Aghion and Howitt 2011 for a survey), however we limit this section
to examine patent races within the real option literature which is methodologically
in line with our study.
Our model is closely related to the seminal study of Smets (1991) where, in its
simplied version discussed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 309-14), two rms face
the decision to enter a new market5 with uncertainty on the demand side (hence, on
the returns of the investment). Irreversibility of investment and uncertainty create
an advantage to delay entry (the option value of waiting), however a rst mover
advantage (given by the opportunity of becoming a monopolist until the rival rm
enters) creates fear of preemption which speeds up entry. This new dynamic in real
option theory, which reduces the option value of waiting, has inspired a growing
literature combining real options and preemption games.
Within the preemption literature, closer to our methodology is the study of Weeds
(2002), who considers the interaction between two rms facing the opportunity to
invest in R&D and compete in a winner-takes-all patent race (i.e. on winning the
race, the patent holder gains a permanent monopoly). Beside uncertainty over the
patent value (which, in line with Smets, evolves according to a geometric brownian
motion), Weeds considers technological uncertainty so that, during R&D, discovery
is a Poisson arrival6. The rst innovator patents (without delay and at no cost)
and fully preempts the rival, thus becoming a monopolist in the product market.
Our study expands the IP setting of Weeds' model and while, after preempting the
rival, the leader becomes a monopolist as in Weeds, the duration of the monopoly
is given by the level of appropriability of the rst innovation. For instance, the rst
innovation might reduce the competitor's probability of discovering a similar product
but still leave opportunities to a competitor to come up with a substitute product and
compete with the former leader; in this case the monopoly (however persistent given
the negative externality from the rst innovation to the second one) will terminate
and be replaced by a duopolistic PM. Also, in our setting, appropriability can be very
narrow, leading to large positive spillovers which will make a second discovery even
more likely than the rst one, thus signicantly reducing the duration of the leader's
5See also Grenadier (1996) where two rms face an `expansion/development decision' and both
rms receive deterministic cash ows prior to expansion.
6This assumption is very common in the R&D literature despite the consideration that knowledge
tends to cumulate and makes R&D output dependent on time, which particularly complicates the
mathematical tractability of real option models.
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monopoly.
In other words, compared to Weeds, our model uses a varying degree of IP appro-
priability rather than one fully blocking patent and by doing this we are able to study
the implications of R&D on PM. In modeling PM, we formulate similar assumptions
as in Smets regarding a stochastic demands.
Throughout our study we assume full information, however the literature on pre-
emption games has incorporated a number of informational issues which expand the
strategy space (as rms conjecture about competitors' entry levels) while explaining
dierent phenomena such as sleeping patents (see the seminal work by Lambrecht,
1999, where patenting and commercialization are distinct choices), positive skewness
and jumps in equity returns (as in Lambrecht and Perraudin, 2003, who analyse in-
vestment opportunities when competitors' investment costs are private information).
The sensitivity of preemption to the information structure has prompted further
research in asymmetric information structure such as Hsu and Lambrecht (2007)
where fear of preemption of an informationally disadvantaged incumbent triggers in-
eciently early investment.
II Model Overview and Assumptions
This section provides an overview of the preemption model set in this paper. We
consider two identical rms, each facing the decision to invest in R&D by paying
an upfront xed cost. Both rms' R&D is targeted to develop a product in a given
market. The rst patent obtained by one rm, the lead patent, does not preclude the
other rm from obtaining a patent which enables production of a perfectly substitute
product. After investment and before discovery by either rm, the probability of
making a discovery and obtaining a patent is the same for both rms. However, after
discovery by one rm, the lead patent aects the probability of a subsequent innova-
tion by the rival rm.7 We assume that the patent fee is zero so that a discovery is
always immediately patented.8 When a rm innovates, the product is commercialized
either in a monopoly market (if only one rm has innovated) or in a duopoly market
(if one innovation is already on the market). Once on the market, each product gen-
erates an instantaneous cash ow which depends on the state of the market demand.
As common with preemption models9, the market demand includes a stochastic com-
ponent which reects changes in preferences.
We summarize our assumptions and provide additional explanations below.
A1. Two identical rm have a given amount K to invest in R&D. The R&D in-
vestment cost is sunk.
7This probability can increase (if there are spillovers from the lead patent) or decrease (if the
rst patent has ample scope and there are no signicant gaps in the patent).
8In the remainder, we will use the terms \innovation" and \patent" interchangeably.
9See among others Smets (1999), Grenadier (1996, 1999, 2002), Lambrecht (2000), Weeds (2002),
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), Hsu and Lambrecht (2007), Miltersen and Schwartz (2004).
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A2. When both rms are engaged in R&D, the time of discovery of the leader (rst
rm to invest), Tl, and the follower
10 (second rm to invest), Tf , is distributed
according to the Freund extension of the bivariate exponential distribution.
Thus, the joint density of Tl and Tf is given by
11:
f(Tl; Tf ) =

h1h2e
 h2Tf (2h1 h2)Tl if 0 < Tl < Tf
h1h2e
 h2Tl (2h1 h2)Tf if 0 < Tf < Tl
(1)
with h1; h2 > 0. When instead only the leader is engaged in R&D then Tl has
the density of a simple exponential with hazard rate h1.
A3. The duration of the patent is innity.
A4. The patenting fee and the production cost are zero.
A5. Patented products are perfect substitutes and share the same market.
A6. Agents are risk neutral; the risk free interest rate is constant and equal to r.
A7. A patented product generates a continuous stream of revenues, with instanta-
neous level given by
ptD (Qt)Qit; for i = 1; 2 (2)
where Qit is the market supply at time t by innovator i and Qt is the total
market supply at time t, i.e. Qt = Q1t if only one rm has innovated by time t
and Qt = Q1t +Q2t if both rms have innovated by time t. The term ptD (Qt)
is the inverse demand function with D () dierentiable and D0 () < 0. pt is a
multiplicative demand shock which evolves according to a geometric Brownian
motion,
dpt = ptdt+ ptdWt; (3)
where  and  are the drift and the volatility of the process respectively and
dWt is a Wiener process. We also assume that  > 
2=2 and  < r.
Assumption A7 can be simplied further. Because production costs are zero and
the stochastic shock enters the demand in a multiplicative form, the optimal
quantity Qit, which maximize the instantaneous revenues, does not depend on
pt
12 as it solves the static problem of maximizing instantaneous revenues. With-
out loss of generality, we can treat the revenue level, net of shock, as a given
parameter and use a more compact and conventional notation (as in Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994).
10Notice that rst rm to invest, the leader, is not necessarily the rst rm to innovate.
11See Freund (1961).
12For instance if production costs were positive, then the optimal quantity produced would depend
on the level of pt and, in turn, on the model equilibrium. The problem would be more complex as
shown by Grenadier (2002).
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We summarize this consideration in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The revenues (net of the shock) D (Qt)Qit, take two values, inde-
pendent of pt: i) D (Qt)Qit = D1 if only one innovator is on the market, or
ii) D (Qt)Qit = D2 if both rms innovate and share the market. As demand
is downward sloping, monopolistic revenues are larger than duopolistic revenues
at the same level of the state variable, pt, thus D2 is strictly less than D1.
The implication of Lemma 1 is that the optimal revenue level net of shock,
D (Qt)Qit, is not endogenously determined and can be exogenously assigned
after specifying the type of competition and the form of D (Qt).
Apart from assumption A2, the remaining assumptions are standard in the liter-
ature of preemption. For clarity, we discuss in more detail some of our assumptions
below.
With assumption A2, when both rms are in the R&D phase, the time of discovery
Tl and Tf are dependent in that the rst discovery by either rm (leader or follower)
changes the hazard rate of the distribution of the other rm from h1 to h2. The
Freund extension of the bivariate exponential is a new feature proposed in the current
paper13, however the use of the exponential time is very common within the real option
literature on R&D14. Although, our characterization of the discovery time belongs to
the exponential family15, the Freund extension allows us to capture the idea that the
rst patent aects the hazard rate of the rival's probability of innovation where h2 can
be greater than equal or less than h1 and the direction and size of the inequality reect
the amount of positive or negative spillovers (thus our measure of appropriability).
Although we are modeling identical rms, the Freund exponential can be used in its
more general formulation so that one can accommodate asymmetries between the two
rms 16
Assumption A4 serves to simplify the analysis17 and avoid introducing further
strategic actions, such as when to patent after a discovery, how to reset output when
13This distribution is very common in engineering applications and it is often used to model
situations where the lifetime of a component is exponential, however it depends on the working
status of another component.
14See also Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1982), Weeds (2002), Miltersen and
Schwartz (2004).
15Memoryless patent races associated with the exponential distribution are very common in the
R&D literature, mainly because time does not enter the model explicitly which generally simplies
the analysis. This is particularly true when also the state of the demand in the product market
is stochastic and thus the lack of memory in R&D avoids dependency on the state of the demand,
which allows to develop simple time homogeneous models. As an example (not in real-option theory
though) of time dependent R&D, see Doraszelski (2003) who augments the hazard rate with a history
dependent component so that past R&D learning cumulates in knowledge stock.
16For instance, the hazard rates could reect exogenous dierences amongst the two rms, so that
one would replace h1 with h1i and/or h2 with h2i (with i = 1; 2).
17Similar assumptions can be found in Weeds (2002) and Miltersen and Schwartz (2004).
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the level of pt changes. In reality the cost of patenting is not zero. However, patent
fees reect the administrative cost of the patent oce rather than a share of the patent
value and they are generally negligible compared to the R&D investment cost.18 As
mentioned, introducing production costs (were these costs large relative to R&D cost)
would add further complexity to the model without changing the qualitative result
of our analysis.19
Assumption A7 follows Dixit and Pindyck20 (1994) and serves to identify the
advantage of being the rst to discover and become a monopolist with larger revenues
(ptD1) than a duopolist (ptD2).
III Leader-Follower Investment Decision
As standard in dynamic leader-follower models, we assume that one of the two rms
(the leader) invests in R&D by paying a sunk cost K strictly before its rival (the
follower). Therefore, as the leader has already invested in R&D, one can use backward
induction and solve rst the investment decision faced by the follower; then, given the
follower's reaction, one can determine the leader's investment decision. In the section
below, we briey characterise a Stackelberg equilibrium and in the next section we
use backward induction to solve for the model equilibrium.
A Characterisation and Existence of a Stackelberg Equilibrium
Intuitively one can imagine that an equilibrium is characterised by a set of threshold
levels of the state variable, say fpL; pFg, which triggers sequential investment, that
is, the leader invests when pt crosses the level pL, and the follower afterwards when
pt crosses the level pF , provided that pL  pF .
However, before providing a formal denition of a dynamic Stackelberg equilib-
rium, we can examine how the follower's investment decision is aected by the oc-
currence of a discovery by the leader. As the leader has already invested, when the
follower invests in R&D, either the leader has made a discovery or not and thus the
follower investment decision at time t depends on the random variable Tl.
More formally, denote the two states, with and without the leader's innovation,
by the subscript 1 and 0 respectively. Then, the follower's entry decision, pF , consists
of a pair of threshold levels of the state variable, say pF0 and pF1, such that, if no
innovation is in place yet (state 0), the follower invests when pt crosses pF0 and, if
the leader has already innovated (state 1), the follower invests when pt crosses pF1.
In terms of stopping times the follower's entry decision is characterised as follows.
18When patent fees are not negligible relative to R&D cost, we refer the reader to Lambrecht
(2000) who analyses the eect of patent fees on R&D investment decisions in a patent race model.
19Grenadier (2002) solves a stochastic optimal control problem with a linear cost for increasing
output in a Cournot framework.
20In particular, see Smets (1991), Grenadier (1996).
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Denition 1 The follower's stopping rule consists of a pair of stopping times:
F =

0 = inff0  t < Tl : pt  pF0g
1 = inffTl  t : pt  pF1g (4)
This tells us that the stopping time F switches on the occurrence of Tl, that is: if
t < Tl the follower invests at time 0, otherwise if Tl  t the follower invests at time
1. This leads to the following proposition
Proposition 1 The time F is a stopping time if and only if pF0  pF1
Proof: A random time  is a stopping time relative to a Brownian ltration (FWt )t0
if by observing the Brownian trajectory (Ws)0st up till t we know whether  has
occurred or not. Now, suppose that pF1 < pF0. The state variable pt might cross pF1
from below without triggering investment at pF1 if Tl does not occur before the rst
passage. This possibility contradicts the denition of 1 (that is, investment occurs
at the rst crossing of pF1). In other words 1 is not a stopping time relative to the
Brownian ltration. 2
We can now characterise a dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium by summarising these
considerations.
Denition 2 A Stackelberg equilibrium consists of a pair of threshold levels of the
state variable, fpL; pFg, with pF = fpF0; pF1g which triggers sequential investment,
with the leader investing as soon as pt crosses the level pL and the follower invests:
i) when pt crosses pF0 if the leader has not discovered yet or ii) when pt crosses pF1
if the leader has already made a discovery. The existence of an equilibrium requires:
pL  pF and pF0  pF1.
B Follower's Decision
In order to determine the follower's entry thresholds, fpF0; pF1g, we make the follow-
ing hypothesis21.
Hypothesis 1 There exists a pair of optimal investment triggers pF0; pF1 such that
pF0  pF1.
Below, we derive the follower's investment values in the three regions f(0; pF0); (pF0; pF1); (pF1;1)g
and the thresholds fpF0; pF1g, which are selected in order to maximise the investment
values.
B.1 Investment Values
In this section we determine the values of the investment by the follower in the
three regions: (0; pF0), [pF0; pF1) and [pF1;1). Let F0 and F1 denote the follower
21We show in Lemma 2 at the end of the next sub-section the range of parameters which satises
hypothesis 1.
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investment values in state 0 (where the leader has not discovered yet) and state 1
(where the leader has already discovered) respectively.
We start with the region [pF1;1). Because pF0  pF1 by Hypothesis 1, at any
level of pt 2 [pF1;1), in either state 0 or 1, the follower invests at once. First consider
the follower revenue, say R(pTf ), at the time of innovation Tf . We can have either
Tf  Tl or Tf > Tl, thus the revenue equals
R(pTf ) =
(
R0(pTf ) =
D1pTf
r  +
(D2 D1)pTf
r 
h2
r+h2  if Tf  Tl
R1(pTf ) =
D2pTf
r  if Tf > Tl
(5)
Therefore, the investment values F0 and F1 are simply given by
22
F0(pt) = E[R0(pTf )e
 r(Tf t) j Tl > t] K (6)
F1(pt) = E[R1(pTf )e
 r(Tf t) j Tl  t] K (7)
We show the result of expectations (6) and (7) in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For pt 2 [pF1;1) the follower investment values F0(pt) and F1(pt)
are given by:
F0(pt) =
pt
r   d0  K; with d0 
h1
r + 2h1   
2D2h2 +D1(r   )
r + h2    ; (8)
F1(pt) =
pt
r   d1  K; with d1 
h2D2
r + h2    (9)
.
Proof: See Appendix. 2
Over the range [pF0; pF1), the follower invests at once if the leader has not yet
innovated, thus F0 is given by (8). If instead the leader has innovated, the follower
waits to invest until pt reaches pF1. This is a simple entry decision and we know that
F1 must solve:
2
2
F 001 (pt)p
2
t + F
0
1(pt)pt = rF1(pt); (10)
where F 001 and F
0
1 denote the rst and second derivative with respect to pt.
Over the range (0; pF0), F1 must still solve (10). Therefore, F1 can be easily found
by solving (10) over the entire range (0; pF1]. By setting standard boundary and
22For sake of brevity we omit the -algebra in the expectations. In general, all information on
the Brownian motion and the exponential time up to time t should be described by the enlarged
-algebra Gt = (Ft [ Ht); generated by Ft and Ht, where Ht = (fTl  sg : s  t), and Ft is the
Brownian ltration.
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smooth-pasting conditions23, thus,
F1(pt) =

pF1
r   d1  K

pt
pF1
0
(11)
with 0 =
 ( 2=2)+
p
( 2)2+22r
2
and
pF1 =
0
0   1
K
d1
(r   ) (12)
Last, we need to determine F0 over (0; pF0). This can be easily done by noticing that
F0 must solve
24:
2
2
F 000 (pt)p
2
t + F
0
0(pt)pt + h1(F1(pt)  F0(pt)) = rF0(pt): (13)
This together with boundary and smooth-pasting conditions (see Appendix) leads
to the result,
F0(pt) = F0(pF0)

pt
pF0
1
+ F1(pF1)
"
pt
pF1
0
 

pF0
pF1
0  pt
pF0
1#
(14)
where 1 =
 ( 2=2)+
p
( 2)2+22(r+h1)
2
and pF0 is the implicit solution to:
1
1   1K =  
1   0
1   1 F1(pF1)

pF0
pF1
0
+
pF0
r   d0: (15)
We summarize the follower values, F0 and F1, in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The follower's R&D investment value is a piecewise function which
takes the following values:
F0(pt) =
8<: F0(pF0)

pt
pF0
1
+ F1(pF1)

pt
pF1
0   pF0
pF1
0 
pt
pF0
1
if pt < pF0
pt
r d0  K if pt  pF0
F1(pt) =
(
F1(pF1)

pt
pF1
0
if pt < pF1
pt
r d1  K if pt  pF1
(16)
with pF0 and pF1 given by (15) and (12) respectively and d0, d1 dened in (8) and
23Boundaries at 0 and pF1 yield limpt!0 F1(pt) = 0, limpt!pF1 F1(pt) =
pF1
r d1   K. Smooth-
pasting implies @F1(pt)@pt jpF1=
@pF1d1=(r ) K
@pt
jpF1 .
24The investment decision here resembles the one in Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.305 (an investment
decision under policy uncertainty based on a simplied version of Metcalf and Hassett, 1993).
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(9).
Notice that F0(pt) for pt < pF0 is a weighted average of the expected discounted
prots (evaluated at the time of investment in R&D, i.e. at pF0 and pF1) conditional
on the two states 0 and 1 and the weights correspond to the stochastic discount factors.
Ee r(0 t)1f0<Tlg and Ee
 r(1 t)1f0>Tlg (see a proof at the end of Appendix).
Lemma 2 The investment threshold pF0 is greater or equal to pF1 if and only if
h2=h1  D1=D2.
Proof: The relation pF0  pF1 holds i F0(pt)  F1(pt) which occurs when d0  d1,
that is (with d0 and d1 given by (8) and (9)), when h1D1  h2D2. 2
The point of lemma (2) is intuitive as it simply shows that there is an advantage
in being the rst to discover if the temporary monopoly revenues, which occur with
hazard h1, are larger than the duopoly revenues occurring with hazard rate h2. Also
notice, the range of parameters which veries Hypothesis 1 is suciently broad (given
that D1=D2  1) to account for spillovers with h2 > h1. The follower value is depicted
in Figure 1.
ptpF0 pF1
Follower's
Values
-K
pt
r - Μ
d0-K
pt
r - Μ
d1-K
F0HptL
F1HptL
Figure 1: Before the leader discovers, the follower's expected discounted prots are
equal to F0(pt) with optimal entry trigger pF0. If the leader innovates before the
follower invests (that is, when pt  pF0), then the follower's value declines from
F0(pt) to F1(pt), with new entry threshold pF1.
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C Leader's Decision
As standard in preemption games, suppose that neither rm has invested, and the
rst rm to invest, the leader, triggers the follower's investment decision analysed
in the previous section. Given the follower's reaction, we can determine the leader's
investment value, L(pt), over the two regions (0; pF0) and [pF0;1). If the leader
invests when pt is in the region [pF0;1), the follower will invest at once. Thus, the
leader's (revenues and therefore) investment value is equal to the follower's one F0(pt).
Next consider the leader's investment region (0; pF0). The leader's revenue is
aected by the timing of innovation, that is, by whether Tl occurs before or after 0.
In particular,
1. either Tl > 0, i.e. the leader discovers after pt crosses pF0. In this case, the
expected discounted revenues of the leader when pt hits pF0 are the same as the
follower's revenue in equation 8), thus we can write the leader's revenue as
F0(pF0) +K =
pF0
r   d0; (17)
2. or Tl  0, i.e. the leader discovers before pt hits the threshold pF0. In this case
we know that the follower delays his investment decision until pt hits the new
threshold level pF1. By knowing the reaction of the follower, we can write the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 If Tl  0 then Tf > 1 and the leader's expected revenues at the time of
discovery Tl are equal to:
D1pTl
r    +
(D2  D1)pF1
r   
h2
r + h2   

pTl
pF1
0
(18)
Proof: One can compare this with the rst of equations 5, the only dierence here
is that the leader loses its monopoly prots and starts earning duopoly ones at Tf
which occurs only after the follower has entered at pF1, therefore the term pTf in the
rst of equations 5 is replaced by pF1(pTl=pF1)
0 . 2
Having derived revenues in the two possible scenarios above, we can write the
leader's expected discounted prots when investment in R&D takes place as
(19)
L(pt) = E
(
pF0
r   d0e
 r(0 t)1fTl>0g
+
"
D1pTl
r    +
(D2  D1)pF1
r   
h2
r + h2   

pTl
pF1
0#
e r(Tl t)1fTl0g
)
 K
We give the result of (19) in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 The leader's R&D investment value over the region (0; pF0) is given
by
(20 )
L(pt) =
pF0
r   d0

pt
pF0
1
+
pt
r   
D1h1
r + h1   
 
1 

pt
pF0
1 1!
+
(D2  D1)pF1
r   
h2
r + h2   

pt
pF1
0  
1 

pt
pF0
1 0!
D Leader-Follower Equilibrium
In order to solve for the leaders' investment trigger, pL, the argument runs as in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994). If there is any incentive to be a leader, that is, to invest when the
state variable is below pF0, it must be that the payo from being the leader is greater
or equal to the payo of being the follower. Then, the optimal entry threshold for the
leader must be such that at pL, the leader's payo is equal or marginally greater than
the follower's payo. This implies that pL must be the root of the following equation
L (pL) = F0 (pL) : (21)
As common in preemption models, the leader's entry pL has no closed form solu-
tion, however, one can easily see that pL and pF0 are the equilibrium strategies of the
Stackelberg game as long as:8<:
L (pt) < F0 (pt) for pt < pL;
L (pt)  F0 (pt) for pL  pt < pF0;
L (pt) = F0 (pt) for pt  pF0;
(22)
The former conditions simply tell us that, for any initial pt below pL, both rms
prefer to wait as the value of waiting (i.e. being the follower) exceeds that from
immediate investment (the value of being the leader); if the initial level of pt is equal
to or greater than pF0, then investment occurs immediately as the value of being the
leader is greater than that of being the follower. In this case one rm at random
invests and becomes the leader while the other rm waits until pt reaches either pF0
(if the leader does not discover) or pF1 (if the leader discovers). Therefore these
conditions guarantee that pL is the rst entry threshold. Last, if the initial pt starts
above pF0, the leader and the follower are in a symmetric race and invest both at
once (the follower optimal entry trigger is pF0).
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium values of the leader and the follower.
Last, one can notice that if h2 goes to zero, our equilibrium entry thresholds pL; pF0
approach the leader's and follower's entry triggers in Weeds' model25 (2002). In this
25To be precise, there is a technical -but not substantial- dierence between our entry levels and
Weed's ones. This is because, unlike Weeds, where the value of the innovation follows a geometric
brownian motion, in our model it is the cash ows from the innovation to follow a geaometric
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PF0PL
pt
-K
Equilibrium Values
F0HptL
LHptL
Figure 2: When F (pt) > L(pt), both rms prefer to wait rather than investing. If pt
is such that F (pt)  L(pt) both rms try to invest in R&D. One at random is the
rst to invest and the other acts then as a follower and delays investment.
limiting case, it is obvious that the follower does not invest if the leader discovers
before pt reaches the level pF0 (that is, pF1 tends to innity when h2 tends to zero).
IV Results
In this section we examine the eect of our parameters on the equilibrium solution
fpL; fpF0; pF1gg and in particular how appropriability aects the market structure
and the speed of innovation. In order to assess the implication of appropriability,
we should assess the eect of the rst innovation on the rival's innovation by setting
h2 = f(h1; y) where y is a measure of spillovers from the rst innovation. A simple
form for f is26 h2 = yh1, where the amount of spillovers is measured as a scale factor
which reduces or expands the technological opportunities, so that, if y < 1, the rst
innovation reduces the spectrum of possibilities open to a second innovator (negative
spillovers, e.g. due to ample scope granted to the rst patent), if y = 1 the innovations
are independent and if y > 1 the rst innovation generates spill-overs which cannot
brownian motion; we have opted for a cash ow model as it allows us to characterise the interaction
between the two rms in the PM.
26One can model this function in dierent ways, according to specic innovations, as long as h2
increases with spillovers and technological opportunities, that is f=h1 > 0 and f=y > 0
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be internalized. Also as the existence of an equilibrium requires that h2=h1  D1=D2
(see lemma (2)), thus we set y  D1=D2 .
Figure 3 shows the eect of y on the equilibrium entry thresholds pL; pF0 and pF1.
Both entry levels pL and pF0 increase with y, while pF1 decreases and it equals pF0
when y = D1=D2, that is, the boundary of lemma (2) is met. The reason why pL
increases with y is the following. The rst mover advantage consists of the possibility
of discovering before the rival invests and earning monopoly revenues at least until the
demand reaches the level pF1 (when the follower invests). If the leader's innovation
spills over to the rival R&D (large y), a second discovery is more likely to occur and
the duration of the leader's monopoly is shortened. Therefore low appropriability
reduces the rst mover advantage and delays the leader's entry threshold (as the
preemption threat is weaker).
As to pF0, the argument is more complex, though intuitive. There are two elements
driving the value of the follower: 1) if the leader does not discover before pF0, the
follower will be competing with the leader on equal terms and the possibility of
winning the (symmetric) race and be a temporary monopolist is the prize of the race,
2) if the leader does discover before pF0, the prots of the follower are given by the
possibility of producing a second innovation. With regard to point 1) above, a larger
y has a detrimental eect as it reduces the price of the race; instead with respect to
point 2) prots go up with y as a second innovation becomes more likely (we remind
that the hazard rate of the second innovation is h2 = yh1). Out of these two divergent
eects of y on the follower value, the positive eect dominates, that is the follower
value increases with y. In response, as it becomes relatively more protable to imitate
via a second innovation than winning the race (this is particularly true if h1 is large)
the follower delays investment, thus pF0 increases with y. It is very interesting that
the response of F (pt) to y aects the entry threshold pF0 in a direction which is
rather uncommon in real option models. Generally, when an entry threshold is set
optimally (as is the case 27 with pF0) an increase in value accelerates entry, while in
this case and increase in value delays entry. In our model this should not surprise as
the convenience to imitate (or come up with an equally successful variant) makes it
protable to delay.
As to pF1, unlike pL and pF0 an increase in y accelerates entry. This is intuitive
as larger spillovers increase the hazard rate of the second innovation, which becomes
more likely28.
To summarise, low appropriability (high y) delays investment in R&D as larger
spillovers make it worthwhile for a competitor to wait (pF0 increases); in turn this
reduces the leader risk of preemption (pL increases) and delays discovery. In other
words when rms cannot easily appropriate the returns from their R&D investment,
27The trigger pF0 maximises the follower value unlike the trigger pL which is determined by fear
of preemption.
28Compared to pF0, the optimal entry trigger pF1 behaves in a `standard' way, that is it declines
when the investment value is more protable.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium threshold levels, pL; pF0 and pF1, as function of y.
.
PM demand should be suciently high to make R&D investment worthwhile. On the
contrary, with high appropriability (small y) both rms invest in R&D at an earlier
stage; this speeds up a rst innovation (as both rms start R&D earlier) but leads
to a more persistent monopoly -i.e. the social cost for an early innovation. In more
general terms, as the independent variable in our setting is the timing of investment,
that is, our measure of R&D intensity, the positive relation between the thresholds
PL; PF0 and y indicates that there is a positive relation between R&D intensity and
PM concentration.
Turning to the eect of h1 on the equilibrium entry levels, generally all entry
triggers decrease when h1 increases. However, while pF1 continues decreasing for
larger h1, with regards to pL and pF0 there is a range of y values where an increase in
h1 beyond a certain level delays investment. The delaying eect is only marginal for
reasonable parameter values and more pronounced on the follower entry threshold pF0
than on pL. Also the delaying eect of h1 is stronger for more protable innovations
(i.e. for larger , , D1 and smaller r, D2). We show this result in Figure 4 where the
equilibrium thresholds are plotted as functions of h1 for three levels of y: y = 0:1, 1,
1:8. The negative eect of h1 is due to the fact that beyond a suciently high level
of h1 a further increase of h1 increases the probability of a second discovery more
than the probability of a rst discovery thus reducing the benets of innovating rst,
which in turn delays investment.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium threshold levels, pL; pF0 and pF1, as function of h1 for dierent
levels of y.
Another interesting implication of the model concerns the time gap between con-
secutive investments, that is the eect of h1 on the dierence between pF0 and pL. In
Figure 5, we plot two sets of equilibrium thresholds for two levels of h1, h1 = 0:004
and h1 = 0:04 (where the larger h1 is still suciently small so that the increase in h1
speeds up investment). Interestingly, for very small h1 the distance between PL and
PF0 narrows with the amount of spillovers and instead for larger h1 it widens with
increasing spillovers. In other words, one could say that with regards to industries
characterised by high-appropriability, R&D of more challenging innovations would
appear more concentrated (as a competitor will invest at or after pF0), while R&D
of less challenging innovations would be less concentrated (with smaller time gaps
between leader's and competitor's investment). The opposite is true with regards to
industries with low appropriability; that is, rms would invest in more dicult R&D
shortly after one another, while with respect to less challenging innovations R&D
would be more concentrated with a longer time gap between consecutive investments.
In general terms, this result indicates that the relation between competition in
R&D and competition in the product market is determined by the joint interaction
between h1 and y. That is, an increase in y can lead to a more or less competitive R&D
depending on h1. This is shown in Figure 6 where the dierence pF0   pL is plotted
as function of h1 and y. While for small levels of h1 the relation between competition
in R&D and PM is positive (as y increases the PM becomes more competitive), the
opposite is true for larger h1.
Therefore the level of appropriability and success rate tell us where a particular
industry or a particular product is located on Figure 6 (and thus the speed of inno-
vation and relation between the two stages of competition in R&D and PM). With
regards to pharmaceutical, bio-tech and chemical industry, these sectors are charac-
terised by very high appropriability29 and very low probability of R&D success which,
according to our prediction and consistently with empirical nding30, lead to strong
29On the contrary, the computer and software industry are characterised by lower appropriability
(see Bessen and Maskin, 2009, also see Fershtman and Markovitch 2010 for a comparison of dierent
R&D technology races and patent regimes).
30See next section where we explain in more detail the structure and patenting policy in the
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Figure 5: Equilibrium threshold levels, pL; pF0 and pF1, as functions of y for two levels
of h1: h1 = 0:004 and h1 = 0:04.
market concentration.
Last, we stress that our setting better ts industries, such as the bio-tech, chemical
and pharmaceutical, where substitute innovations (i.e. variants) are common and
where one innovation becomes one product as opposed to products which embed
multiple complementary innovations.31
V Pharmaceutical patents
In this section we briey describe some aspects of pharmaceutical patents which
motivate the methodology used in this paper and in particular the relation between
the hazard rates of rms competing in R&D.
In the pharmaceutical industry it is common to observe drugs protected by patents
competing with other patented drugs in the same therapeutic class. Competition
occurs between a very small number of players as, although the industry appears
competitive when viewed at aggregate level, concentration is extremely high at ther-
pharmaceutical industry.
31These latter types of innovations are common in the computer and software industry where the
diusion of innovation is generally benecial even when diusion involves pure imitation (see Bessen
and Maskin, 2009).
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Figure 6: Dierence pF0   pL as function of y and h1.
apeutic class level, with only a few rms competing within a therapeutic class. For
example, according to Schweitzer (2007, pp.26-27) Pzer and Merck had 8:6% and
4:8% respectively of total prescription sales in 2003, but 50% and 30% of sales in the
market of statins in the same year with only four rms accounting for 98% of sales
(see also Matraves, 1999 and Schweitzer, 2007).
The bulk of pharmaceutical R&D targeting to creating variants of a drug is so vast
that often the industry has been criticized for creating unnecessary variants.32 The
process of creating variants however is far from being a simple one and while variants
are broadly perceived as substitute they cannot be thought as pure imitations such
as generics which do not involve R&D.33
The long and uncertain pharmaceutical R&D heavily relies on patents, generally
granted with very ample scope. When a patent for a potential new drug is applied for,
the application is written to try and cover as much as possible, far wider than what was
actually discovered. So for example, for a new chemical compound with potential drug
activity, the applicant will try and cover in a generalized way as many compounds
as they think might be active, even if only a few compounds that show activity
32Sneader (2005).
33As Sneader (2005) points out \It may be easy to discover a substitute drug, but extremely
dicult to discover one which is safe".
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have been tested. The generalized structure (called Markush formulae) contains a
very large number of compounds to allow for variants and the patent agent's job
is to try and be as innovative as possible and cover hundreds to billions of new
chemical structures. The purpose is to carve out a great area in which the patentee
can investigate related structures without a competitor taking opportunities away.
Nevertheless, the patentee can miss some combination of compounds which leaves
potential gaps for a competitor to investigate.
However, whether a patent is eective ultimately depends on technological pos-
sibilities. If a newly patented drug can be altered by changing part of the structure
whilst still retaining (or preferably enhancing) the activity, it is possible for com-
petitors to succeed in R&D. If instead it is dicult to alter the drug without losing
activity (and if the original patentee has claimed the key basic structure and covered
a large number of other substituent patterns), then a competitor can only succeed by
nding gaps in the patent thicket. If there are no gaps, the competitor has to look for
completely dierent and novel structures, as many of the compounds in earlier drug
cannot be used as a lead compound.
For example, with small molecule drugs (also known as chemical drugs) the patent
family will probably cover a vast amount of chemical structures with little space for
a second company to develop a similarly chemically structured product, but, as men-
tioned, there are potential gaps. For example Astra Zeneca developed omeprazole
(Losec), a new compound which had a new mechanism of action (proton pump in-
hibitor), and widely patented related chemical structures. However Takeda found a
few gaps in the Markush formula34 and obtained lansoprazole -a similar structure to
omeprazole- and other compounds such as pantoprazole and rabeprazole were sepa-
rately patented by other companies. Whilst AZ did exceedingly well from omeprazole,
competitors did very well with their related drugs, though they came on the market
somewhat later.
When instead the focus is on a new biological action rather than chemical struc-
ture and the receptor might accommodate dierent chemical structures, it may be
that there are potentially many dierent compounds that could work. For example
cimetidine by SKF, which was regarded as the breakthrough antiulcer drugs H2 an-
tagonist (sold as Tagamet), was a great success, but Glaxo came up with a dierent
chemical compound which had the same eect and marketed ranitidine as Zantac,
which was even more successful than Tagamet even though it was second on the mar-
ket35. The statins are another example of patent spillovers, where an initial discovery
spawned related chemical structures, so that competitors could substitute part of the
structure of the earlier statin to mimic and improve activity. These new compounds
34This particular drug worked by in-vivo rearrangement of the compound and competitors had to
look for gaps in the Markush formula as they needed the same basic structure for it to work.
35With cimetidine, SKF covered a vast amount of structures around cimetidine, but Glaxo dis-
covered that a similar structure but with a dierent hetero-ring also worked. The Glaxo ring wasnt
covered by SKF and hence Zantac (ranitidine) was separately patented.
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are new chemicals and are dierent enough to be separately patentable.
These examples show how the design of a lead patent aims at reducing the prob-
ability of rivals' innovations. However, despite the design eorts of a lead innovator,
it might occur that the lead patent increases the probability of rivals' innovation. In
order to incorporate these features we have i) made the probability of success of a
rival's R&D dependent on the occurrence of a lead innovation and ii) allowed the
hazard rate of a second innovation to increase or decrease thus incorporating positive
or negative spillovers.
VI Conclusion
We have developed a model which builds on Weeds' (2002) study of preemption ex-
tending it to model innovations by lead and follower innovators (with dependence
between the two) using the Freund extension to the the bivariate exponential distri-
bution. In the past studies, patents are modelled in extreme ways either as providing
the holder with IP protection (i.e., blocking competition fully at least for the duration
of the patent) or as providing no protection. In our model, we examine intermediate
cases by assuming that patents may be more or less eective in protecting IP. By
characterising the eect of a lead patent on the probability of a future discovery by
a rival, we are able to examine the eect of R&D investment on the product market.
We have found that low appropriability (large spillovers) delays R&D investment
and innovation, leading to less persistent monopoly, quickly replaced by competi-
tion between substitute innovations. Analysing the implication of appropriability on
welfare would be a relevant extension of this study.
Furthermore, the interaction between the (ex-ante) probability of success in R&D
and the amount and direction of spillovers (positive or negative) has an eect on the
gap between consecutive R&D entry thresholds. This can help to better understand
certain industries, for instance, why some innovations trigger sudden interest by a
number of competitors after a long period of inactivity while other innovations are
lead by one innovator for a long period of time before a rival invests in R&D. In this
regard, it might be worth extending the model to increase the number of rms.
Also, the inclusion of production costs or a lump sum commercialization cost
(which would not add excessive complexity) can be of particular relevance in certain
markets, such as biologics, where the production phase is generally very expensive.
Last, the model can be easily extended to account for asymmetries between com-
petitors, regarding investment costs for instance or asymmetries in R&D which can
be dealt with by using the Freund extension in its generalised formulation (with a
dierent ex-ante and ex post hazard rates for each innovator).
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A Appendix with Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Follower' expected prots if t < Tl: F0(pt) The follower expected prots if the leader
has not innovated, that is F0(pt) at t < Tl, from equation 16 and 5 can be written as the
sum of two expectations, that is:
F0(pt) = E[R(pTf )e
 r(Tf t) j Tl > t] K
= E[
D2pTf
r    e
 r(Tf t)1fTf>Tlg j Tl > t] +
+ E

D1pTf
r     
(D1  D2)pTf
r   
h2
r + h2   

e r(Tf t)1fTfTlg j Tl > t

 K;(23)
=
pt
r   d0  K; with d0 
h1
r + 2h1   
2D2h2 +D1(r   )
r + h2    (24)
If Tf > Tl the joint density of the Freund bivariate exponential is f(Tl; Tf ) = h1h2e
 h2(Tf Tl) 2h1(Tl t)
and the rst expectation in equation 23 solves as follows:
E
D2pTf
r    e
 r(Tf t)1fTf>Tlg = (25)
=
Z 1
t
Z 1
Tl
D2pTf
r    e
 r(Tf t)h1h2e h2(Tf Tl)dTfe 2h1(Tl t)dTl (26)
= h1h2
D2pt
r   
Z 1
t
Z 1
Tl
e( r h2)(Tf Tl)dTfe (2h1 h2)(Tl t)dTl (27)
= h1h2
D2pt
r   
Z 1
t
e( r 2h1)(Tl t)
r + h2    dTl (28)
=
h1h2D2pt
(r   )(r + h2   )(r + 2h1   ) : (29)
If Tf  Tl the joint density of the Freund bivariate exponential is f(Tl; Tf ) = h1h2e h2(Tl Tf ) 2h1(Tf t)
and the second expectation in equation 23 solves similarly,
E

D1pTf
r     
(D1  D2)pTf
r   
h2
r + h2   

e r(Tf t)1fTfTlg (30)
=

D1   (D1  D2) h2
r + h2   
Z 1
t
pTf
r   e
 r(Tf t)
Z 1
Tf
h1h2e
 h2(Tl Tf )dTle 2h1(Tf t)dTf ;
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where the double integral rearranges as follows,Z 1
t
pTf
r   e
 r(Tf t)
Z 1
Tf
h1h2e
 h2(Tl Tf )dTle 2h1(Tf t)dTf (31)
=
pt
r   h1h2
Z 1
t
e( r)(Tf t)
Z 1
Tf
e h2(Tl t)dTle (2h1 h2)(Tf t)dTf (32)
=
pt
r   
h1h2
h2
Z 1
t
e( r 2h1)(Tf t)dTf (33)
=
pth1
(r   )(r + 2h1   ) : (34)
Taking the sum of revenues in equation 29 and equation 30 (with the integrals given by
equation 34) minus cost K yields
F0(pt) =
D2pt
r   
h1h2
(r + h2   )(r + h1 + h2   )+
pt
r   
h1
r + h1 + h2   

D1 +
(D2  D1)h2
r + h2   

 K
(35)
which rearranges as
F0(pt) =
pt
r   
h1
r + 2h1   
2D2h2 +D1(r   )
r + h2     K (36)
Follower' expected prots if t > Tl: F1(pt). From 5, the follower expected revenues at
time t > Tl when the leader has already innovated, F1(pt), is given by:
F1(pt) = = E[R(pTf )e
 r(Tf t) j Tl < t] K (37)
= E

D2pTf
r    e
 r(Tf t) j Tl  t

 K
(38)
where the expectation can be rearranged as follows,
E

D2
pTf
r   e
 r(Tf t) j t > Tl

= (39)
= D2
pt
r   
Z 1
t
e r(Tf t)h2e h2(Tf t)dTf (40)
= D2
pt
r   
h2
r + h2    (41)
Proof of equation 14
For pt 2 (0; pF0] the time to a rst discovery has a simple exponential density (because
the follower has not invested yet). Therefore, the problem is a simple entry decision where
the occurrence of a Poisson event with hazard rate h1 changes the investment payo; thus,
we know that (see Dixit and Pindick (1994, p.305 where a more elaborate version of this
24
problem is explained) F0 must satisfy:
2
2
F 000 (pt)p
2
t + F
0
0(pt)pt + h1(F1(pt)  F0(pt)) = rF0(pt): (42)
By setting:
F0(pt) = Ap

t +Bp

t (43)
equation 42 becomes:
2=2[(  1)Ap 2t + (   1)Bp 2t ]pt2 + (44)
+(Apt
 1 + Bpt 1)pt + h1F1(pF1)

pt
pF1
0
= (r + h1)(Ap

t +Bp

t )
which yields the following system of equations:
2=2(  1) +   (r + h1) = 0 (45)
2=2(   1)Bpt + Bpt + h1F1(pF1)

pt
pF1
0
= (r + h1)Bp
: (46)
The above system with usual boundary conditions, limpt!0 F0(pt) = 0 and F0(pF0) given
by equation 8 gives the following constants:
 =
 (  2=2) +p(  2)2 + 22(r + h1)
2
= 1 (47)
 =
 (  2=2) +p(  2)2 + 22(r + h1)
2
= 0 (48)
A =
 
F0(pF0)  F1(pF1)

pF0
pF1
0! 1
pF0
0
(49)
B = F1(pF1)

1
pF1
0
(50)
Substituting for the constants into equation 43, one obtains
F0(pt) =
 
F0(pF0)  F1(pF1)

pF0
pF1
0! pt
pF0
0
+ F1(pF1)

pt
pF1
0
(51)
which after some simple algebra rearranges into equation 14.
Stochastic discount factors
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The following expectation rearranges:
Ee r(0 t)1f0<Tlg (52)
= E[e r(0 t)E(1f0<Tlg j 0)] (53)
= E[e r(0 t)Pr(0 < Tl j 0)] (54)
= Ee (r+h1)(0 t) (55)
=

pt
pF0
1
(56)
with 1 =
 (  2=2) +p(  2)2 + 22(r + h1)
2
: (57)
Similarly, we can rearrange the expectation below as follows (the algebra below requires
using the independence property of non-overlapping stopping times36 (1  0 and 0  t).):
Ee r(1 t)1f0>Tlg = (58)
= Ee r(1 0)e r(0 t)1f0>Tlg (59)
= Ee r(1 0)Ee r(0 t)1f0>Tlg (60)
=

pF0
pF1
0
Ee r(0 t)1f0>Tlg (61)
=

pF0
pF1
0
Ee r(0 t)(1  eh1(0 t)) (62)
=

pF0
pF1
0  pt
pF0
0
 

pF0
pF1
0
Ee (r+h1)(0 t) (63)
=

pt
pF1
0
 

pF0
pF1
0  pt
pF0
1
(64)
36the Markov property of a Brownian motion extends to stopping times relative to a Brownian
ltration.
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